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STICKS AND STONES:
HOW THE FTC'S NAME-CALLING MISSES THE
COMPLEXITY OF LICENSING-BASED BUSINESS
MODELS
Kristen Osenga"
INTRODUCTION
It is a scary time to be a firm that operates under a patent licensing
business model ("patent licensing firms"). These firms are receiving an
extraordinary amount of scrutiny, not to mention bad press.' As the story
goes, these firms allegedly send threatening letters, which seek exorbitant
license fees for patents that are probably invalid and that cover technology
they did not develop.' They purportedly delay offering licenses until manu-
facturig companies are deeply engaged in making and selling products that
incorporate the patented technology, forcing the manufacturing companies
to choose between taking a license and losing a significant portion of their
business.3 When patent licensing firms do file lawsuits against manufactur-
ing companies, conventional wisdom is that the primary purpose of the suit
* J.D. 2000, University of Illinois College of Law; M.S. 2001, Southern Illinois University at
Carbondale; B.S.E. 1994, University of Iowa. I appreciate the helpful comments of Eric Claeys during
the editing of this Essay.
1 The scrutiny of patent licensing firms comes from all corners, but seems to be particularly
prevalent in Congress at present. See, e.g., Danny Vinik, The One Thing Democrats and Republicans
Say They Can Get Done in 2015 Will Put You to Sleep, NEW REPUBLIC (Nov. 5, 2014),
http://www.newrepublic.com/article/ 20142/republicans-and-democrats-patent-reform-will-happen-
114th-congress (describing how both political parties have patent reform, and particularly a measure
aimed at patent trolls, at the top of the new agenda). Bad press associated with patent licensing firms has
been consistent and longstanding. See, e.g., Ashby Jones, Patent 'Troll" Tactics Spread, WALL ST. J.
(July 8, 2012), http://online.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702303292204577514782932390996;
This American Life: When Patents Attack!, CHI. PUB. MEDIA (July 22, 2011),
http://www.thisamericanlife.org/radio-archives/episode/441/when-patents-attack.
2 See, e.g., John "Jay" Jurata, Jr. & Amisha R. Patel, Taming the Trolls.' Why Antitrust Is Not a
Viable Solution for Stopping Patent Assertion Entities, 21 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1251, 1252, 1256
(2014) (detailing complaints that "patent trolls" engage in "demand letter campaigns threatening litiga-
tion unless the recipient pays exorbitant licensing fees" and "are often made without regard to the validi-
ty of the patents at issue or the merits of such allegations"); Anup Malani & Jonathan S. Masur, Raising
the Stake in Patent Cases, 101 GEO. L.J. 637, 645 (2013) ("On the flip side, there are frequent com-
plaints about 'patent trolls' . . . who either patent ideas that require little research or purchase patents
based on others' research, then do not make any risky investment to develop those patented ideas.").
3 See, e.g., Malani & Masur, supra note 2, at 645 ("[Patent trolls] wait[] until some other party
takes the expense and risk to commercialize these ideas and, if the other party is successful, files an
infringement suit to extract a portion of the latter's profits.").
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is to force a quick settlement and to obtain money without having the valid-
ity of the firm's patents called into question. As President Obama tersely
put it, these firms "hijack somebody else's idea" simply to "extort some
money. "'
Whether a firm is solely a patent licensing firm or operates only par-
tially under this business model, it is lumped into a single category. Regard-
less of whether or not a firm engages in the potentially negative behaviors
enumerated above, these firms are saddled collectively with the label "pa-
tent troll," in an instance of name-calling that rivals those on elementary
school playgrounds. No matter whether that category is the pejorative "pa-
tent troll," or one of the supposedly less disparaging terms-"non-
practicing entity" ("NPE"), or "patent assertion entity" ("PAE"), or "patent
monetization entity" ("PME")-the bottom line is that patent licensing
firms have been deemed "a huge problem." 6 In addition to the accusations
described above, highly touted, albeit problematic, studies claim that patent
licensing firms account for over 60 percent of lawsuits and have led to $29
billion in costs.7 These studies, coupled with theoretical claims and anecdo-
tal remarks, are being used to justify various efforts to reform the patent
4 See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley & A. Douglas Melamed, Missing the Forest for the Trolls, 113
COLUM. L. REv. 2117, 2126 (2013) (highlighting a growing type of patent troll "interested in quick,
low-value settlements" and that do not want to go to trial).
5 President Obama made these remarks during a Google Hangout, responding to "an entrepre-
neur" who expressed concern about patent trolls. Ali Sternburg, Obama Acknowledges Patent Troll
Problem [w/ Transcript], PAT. PROGRESS (Feb. 14, 2013), http://www.patentprogress.org
/2013/02/14/obama-acknowledges-patent-troll-problem-w-transcript; see also Dustin Volz, White
House on Patent Trolls: It's Your Turn, Congress, NAT'L J. (Feb. 21, 2014),
http://www.nationaljournal.com/tech/white-house-on-patent-trolls-its-your-tum-congress-20 140221
(describing executive actions designed to combat patent trolls, as well as comments from members of
the executive branch).
6 See, e.g., Press Release, Senator Charles E. Schumer, Schumer: 'Patent Trolls' Preying on New
York's Technology Industry with Unwarranted Lawsuits-Costing Legitimate Companies Billions of
Dollars; Announces New Legislation to Crackdown on Growing Problem (May 2, 2013),
http://www.schumer.senate.gov/record.cfm?id=341 612 (calling "patent trolls" a "growing problem").
7 James Bessen & Michael J. Meurer, The Direct Costs from NPE Disputes, 99 CORNELL L. REV.
387, 396-97 (2014) (claiming "patent trolls" are costing companies $29 billion a year); Colleen Chien,
Patent Trolls by the Numbers, PATENTLY-O (Mar. 14, 2013), http://patentlyo.com/patent/2013/03/chien-
patent-trolls.html (attributing 62 percent of lawsuits filed in 2012 to PAEs). These studies have been
used to support the scrutiny and bad press that have surrounded patent licensing firms. See, e.g., Dara
Kerr, Patent Trolls Curb Innovation and Cost the U.S. $29B in 2011, CNET (June 26, 2012, 5:41 PM),
http://www.cnet.com/news/patent-trolls-curb-innovation-and-cost-the-u-s-29b-in-201 I/; Rebecca J.
Rosen, Study: Patent Trolls Cost Companies $29 Billion Last Year, ATLANTIC (June 29, 2012, 7:37
AM), http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2012/06/study-patent-trolls-cost-companies-29-
billion-last-year/259070/. However, these studies, and in particular Bessen and Meurer's, have been
criticized for substantive and methodological failings, See David L. Schwartz & Jay P. Kesan, Analyzing
the Role of Non-Practicing Entities in the Patent System, 99 CORNELL L. REv. 425, 431-45 (2014).
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system in Congress and the courts.8 Now the Federal Trade Commission
("FTC") has taken up the gauntlet against patent licensing firms, asserting
that these firms negatively impact innovation and competition.'
But what if the problem is not, as is being claimed, the existence of pa-
tent licensing firms? After all, the patent licensing business model is not
new-inventors, including such American icons as Thomas Edison and
Charles Goodyear, have monetized their inventions through licensing for
years.'0 Just as there are negative inferences drawn from theory and anec-
dote, there are theories and anecdotes that support claims that these firms
have positive effects on innovation and competition. " This Essay asserts
that the real problem is that patent licensing firms are treated as a homoge-
nous category, with no attention paid to the wide range of business models
that exist under the patent licensing firm umbrella. The categorical determi-
nation of patent licensing firms as "problems" imputes to a large, diverse
8 See, e.g., Stopping the Offensive Use of Patents Act, H.R. 2766, i3th Cong.
(2013); Patent Litigation and Innovation Act of2013, H.R. 2639, 113th Cong. (2013); End Anonymous
Patents Act, H.R. 2024, 113th Cong. (2013); Patent Abuse Reduction Act of 2013, S. 1013, 113th Cong.
(2013); Patent Quality Improvement Act of 2013, S. 866, 113th Cong. (2013); Saving High-Tech Inno-
vators from Egregious Legal Disputes Act of2013, H.R. 845, 113th Cong. (2013). See also Alice Corp.
v. CLS Bank Int'l, No. 13-298, slip op. at 5-10 (U.S. June 19, 2014) (discussing primarily the patent
eligibility of software and business method patents, but the "patent troll problem" played heavily
throughout the arguments and opinion); Octane Fitness v. Icon Health & Fitness, No. 12-1184, slip op.
at 7-11 (U.S. Apr. 29, 2014) (making it easier to shift attorney's fees in exceptional cases, removing the
burden from Congress to pass a fee-shifting bill); BriefofGoogle Inc. et al. as Amici Curiae in Support
of Respondents at 33-34, Alice Corp., No. 13-298 (U.S. 2014).
9 FED. TRADE COMM'N, THE EVOLVING IP MARKETPLACE: ALIGNING PATENT NOTICE AND
REMEDIES WITH COMPETITION 8 (2011) [hereinafter EVOLVING IP MARKETPLACE], available at
http://www. ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/evolving-ip-marketplace-aligning-patent-
notice-and-remedies-competition-report-federal-trade/l 0307patentreport.pdf ("Increasing activity by
[PAEs] in the information technology (IT) industry has amplified concerns about the effects of ex post
patent transactions on innovation and competition." (footnote omitted)). This concern has manifested the
PAE Study at the core of this Essay. See infra Part II.
10 See, e.g., CHARLES SLACK, NOBLE OBSESSION: CHARLES GOODYEAR, THOMAS HANCOCK, AND
THE RACE TO UNLOCK THE GREATEST INDUSTRIAL SECRET OF THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 195 (2002)
(discussing the prominence of Goodyear's patent licenses throughout the world); Naomi R. Lamoreaux
et al., Patent Alchemy: The Market for Technology in US History, BUS. HIST. REV., Spring 2013, at 3, 6
(discussing Edison's dependence on licensing early in his career). Goodyear did not just license his
patents, but also litigated to enforce them. E.g., Goodyear v. Beverly Rubber Co., 10 F. Cas. 638, 638
(C.C.D. Mass. 1859) (No. 5,557); Adam Mossoff, Who Cares What Thomas Jefferson Thought About
Patents? Reevaluating the Patent "Privilege" in Historical Context, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 953, 991
n.183 (2007).
11 See, e.g., Kristen Osenga, Formerly Manufacturing Entities: Piercing the "Patent Troll" Rhet-
oric, 47 CONN. L. REV. 435, 453, 455-63 (2014); James F. McDonough ll, Comment, The Myth of
the Patent Troll: An Alternative View of the Function of Patent Dealers in an Idea Economy, 56 EMORY
L.J. 189, 190 (2006); Timothy Holbrook, Not All Patent Trolls Are Demons, CNN (Feb. 21, 2014, 9:08
AM), http://www.cnn.com/2014/02/21/opinion/holbrook-patent-trolls-demons/. For a helpful discussion
of both sides of the "patent troll" conversation, see Sannu K. Shrestha, Note, Trolls or Market-Makers?
An Empirical Analysis of Nonpracticing Entities, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 114, 119-31 (2010).
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group of firms the negative actions and qualities of a small number of bad
actors. 2 To theorize about, propose legislative reform of, or even to develop
a study of patent licensing firms, without acknowledging the myriad of pos-
sible business models that underlie the category, is naYve and inaccurate. To
borrow from the playground retort to name-calling, this is a case where
words actually can hurt, much more so than sticks and stones.
The purpose of this Essay is not to condemn the FTC study of PAEs.
Instead, the FTC's study could be an incredibly important step in the right
direction towards understanding the many complex business models that
exist in the patent licensing world and how these firms affect innovation
and competition. Although others have tried to study patent licensing firms
using publicly available information, litigation information, or proprietary
survey data, the FTC's study has the potential to be much more valuable
because the Commission is authorized under § 6(b) of the Federal Trade
Commission Act to compel corporations, persons, or partnerships to pre-
pare and file special reports. 3 The FTC study is thus likely to uncover pre-
viously unattainable information, yet very relevant to understanding the
effects of patent licensing firms. Unfortunately, the lack of evidence so far
has been used to support the claims that these types of firms are harmful. 4
But as FTC Commissioner Joshua Wright has stated, the study could add
much-needed data to the largely unsupported theories that are driving patent
reform efforts. 5 Unfortunately the FTC study is destined to produce incom-
plete and inaccurate results because the FTC's definition of PAE, which
will determine what firms are selected to respond to the survey, is premised
on a one-size-fits-all conception of patent licensing firms. Further, the very
few questions that inquire about a responding firm's business model do not
adequately investigate some important facets of patent licensing firms. For
12 The same conventional wisdom that ascribes negative attributes to all patent licensing firms
also seems to conveniently ignore that bad actions are also committed by practicing entities and other
non-patent licensing firms.
13 15 U.S.C. § 46(b) (2012).
14 Matt Levy, The FTC Chairwoman Calls Out Patent Assertion Entities, PAT. PROGRESS (June
20, 2013), www.patentprogress.org/2013/06/20/the-ftc-chairwoman-calls-out-patent-assertion-entities/
(quoting FTC Chairwoman Edith Ramirez as saying "[t]he limited evidence we have today tends to
support the Commission's concern that PAEs may do more to distort than improve incentives to invent"
(quoting Edith Ramirez, Chairwoman, Fed. Trade Comm'n, Opening Remarks Before the Computer &
Communications Industry Association and American Antitrust Institute Program: Competition Law &
Patent Assertion Entities: What Antitrust Enforcers Can Do 7 (June 20, 2013) (internal quotation marks
omitted), available at https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/public-statements/competition-
law-patent-assertion-entities-what-antitrust-enforcers-can-do/1 30620paespeech.pdf)).
15 Melissa Lipman, FTC Patent Troll Study to Disappoint Some, Wright Says, LAW 360 (Sept. 4,
2014, 5:32 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/573222/ftc-patent-troll-study-to-disappoint-some-
wright-says (quoting Commissioner Wright as saying that the study may provide some data on an issue
that is "chock fall of theory and supposition but completely devoid of empirical evidence" and has the
potential to improve the "incredibly, remarkably, intolerably high ratio of theory to evidence in this
space").
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these reasons, it is likely that the conclusions and inferences drawn from the
study will fall into the trap created by the current rhetoric surrounding pa-
tent licensing firms, and will thus squander this opportunity to gain an un-
derstanding of a very complex economic, competition, and innovation eco-
system.
Part I of this Essay describes the genesis of the FTC's interest in patent
licensing firms and the details of the § 6(b) study. 6 It also explores the un-
derlying bases for the FTC's interest in this area, specifically the claims
about how patent licensing firms impact innovation and competition. Part II
explains that the FTC's study will not provide a true picture of how these
firms affect innovation and competition due to its failure to recognize the
heterogeneity of patent licensing firms in its survey population and ques-
tions. In fact, the FTC's narrow view of patent licensing firms and behav-
iors could, in fact, cause more harm than good; inaccurate and incomplete
data will go far to bolster the inapt theories that are currently holding the
day for those who wish to hinder, if not destroy, patent licensing firms. A
wider viewpoint, one that recognizes and engages with the variations that
exist amongst patent licensing firms and how the differences may manifest
as positive or negative effects depending on a firm's business model, would
be a better indicator of what types of legal and policy changes are in order.
I. THE FTC AND PATENT LICENSING FIRMs
The FTC is charged with preventing anticompetitive business practices
and enhancing consumer choice, for example by promoting innovation. 17
Given the bad behaviors attributed to patent licensing firms, accurate or not,
it is unsurprising that the FTC has taken an interest. An initial indication of
the FTC's interest appeared in a 2011 report, entitled The Evolving IP Mar-
ketplace: Aligning Patent Notice and Remedies with Competition, which
discussed providing narrower remedies for patent infringement in cases
involving what the report deemed "patent assertion entities."'" In the report,
PAEs were defined as firms with a business model that "[primarily] focuses
on purchasing and asserting patents against manufacturers already using the
16 This Essay will refer to "patent licensing firms," rather than PAEs to signal that the category of
patent licensing firms is much broader and complex than is understood. However, when referring specif-
ically to FTC documents or actions, this Essay will use the FTC's terminology, PAE.
17 About the FTC, FED. TRADE COMMISSION, http://www.ftc.gov/about-flc (last visited Jan. 26,
2015) (stating that the Federal Trade Commission's mission is to "prevent business practices that are
anticompetitive or deceptive or unfair to consumers; to enhance informed consumer choice and public
understanding of the competitive process; and to accomplish this without unduly burdening legitimate
business activity").
18 See EVOLVING IP MARKETPLACE, supra note 9, at 7-9.
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technology."' 9 PAEs are contrasted to practicing entities that manufacture
and sell goods that incorporate patented technology to consumers and to
NPEs, which the FTC differentiates as "patent owners that primarily seek to
develop and transfer technology, such as universities and semiconductor
design houses."2 Based on these definitions, the FTC noted a surge in pa-
tent sales and litigation, and attributed this increase to PAEs. 2' The conclu-
sion was that these activities negatively affect innovation and competition.22
The 2011 report was followed by a joint roundtable in December
2012, convened by the FTC and the Department of Justice, to examine the
effects of PAE activities on innovation and competition. 3 On the heels of
the roundtable, a period was held to receive comments from the public
about PAEs.24 In September 2013, the FTC offered its original proposal for
a study of PAEs and in October 2013, the FTC published its First Notice
soliciting comments on the proposed study. 25 Based on public comments
received during the notice and comment period, the FTC published a re-
vised proposal for comments in May 2014.26 Both requests for comments
yielded many responses, with most expressing support for the study and
especially for the FTC to obtain data that is otherwise unavailable. 27 Alt-
hough the costs of compliance for the select PAEs and other parties com-
pelled to answer would be high, the general belief was that the potential
benefits outweighed those costs. 2 8 To address the cost concern, however,
the FTC did narrow the document requests to be more focused and less
burdensome for the answering parties. 29 In August 2014, the Office of Man-
agement and Budget approved the FTC's request to study PAEs.3"
19 Id. at 8 & n.5. This definition has been somewhat refined over time. See infra note 84 and
accompanying text.
20 See EVOLVING IP MARKETPLACE, supra note 9, at 8 n.5 (stating that the definitions of PAEs
and NPEs, at least in the view of the FTC, are mutually exclusive).
21 Id. at 60.
22 Id. at 8-9.
23 Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm'n, Federal Trade Commission, Department of Justice to Hold
Workshop on Patent Assertion Entity Activities (Nov. 19, 2012), http://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-
releases/2012/1 I/federal -trade-commission-department-justice-hold-workshop-patent.
24 Id.
25 Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm'n, FTC Seeks to Examine Patent Assertion Entities and Their
Impact on Innovation, Competition (Sept. 27, 2013), http://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-
releases/2013/09/ftc-seeks-examine-patent-assertion-entities-their-impact; Agency Information Collec-
tion Activities; Proposed Collection; Comment Request, 78 Fed. Reg. 61,352, 61,352 (Oct. 3, 2013).
26 Agency Information Collection Activities; Submission for OMB Review; Comment Request,
79 Fed. Reg. 28,715, 28,715 (May 19, 2014) [hereinafter May 2014 Comment Request].
27 Id. at 28,716.
28 Id.
29 Id.
30 E.g., Matt Larson, FTC "Patent Assertion Entity Study" Approved, ESSENTIAL PAT. BLOG
(Aug. 14, 2014), http://www.essentialpatentblog.com/2014/08/ftc-patent-assertion-entity-study-
approved/.
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Impetus for the FTC's study did not come solely from participants of
the roundtable and comments submitted by the public. The Executive Of-
fice of the President reported that "suits brought by PAEs tripled in just the
last two years" and President Obama himself has made multiple calls for
patent reform.3' Members of Congress personally urged the FTC to study
"the abusive practices of [PAEs] that are a drag on innovation, competition,
and our economy."32 The Government Accountability Office ("GAO"),
having been directed by Congress to study the impact of PAE litigation,
issued a report in August 2013, which found an increase in litigation (alt-
hough far less than that reported by the Executive Office) but stated that
several data deficiencies limited its ability to study the issue in detail.33
Based on all of these preliminary inputs, the FTC decided to further inves-
tigate PAEs using its investigatory power under § 6(b) of the Federal Trade
Commission Act. 34 The § 6(b) study is described in greater detail in Section
A, along with a discussion in Section B of the potential impacts PAEs may
have on innovation and competition policy.
A. 6(b) Study
Thus far, data about PAE activity have been limited to publicly availa-
ble documents (i.e., litigation data). However, the great bulk of patent li-
censing activity occurs before, and outside of, the litigation context, and
therefore out of the public's view. The FTC's ability to obtain non-public
data on licensing requests, negotiations, and agreements, patent acquisi-
tions, and other information related to these activities will open the door to
a greater understanding of patent licensing firms. As the FTC puts it, the
study "will add significantly to the existing literature and evidence about
PAE form, structure, organization, and behavior."35 The study is ideally not
meant to signal the FTC's sanction or censure of patent licensing firms.36
Instead, it should "present[] descriptive data and descriptive analytics to the
world."37
31 E.g., May 2014 Comment Request, supra note 26, at 28,715 (internal quotation marks omitted).
32 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Other Congressional leaders, including Senator Patrick
Leahy, made similar requests. Press Release, Senator Patrick Leahy, Leahy Urges FTC to Act Against
Patent Trolls (June 20, 2013), http://www.1eahy.senate.gov/press/leahy-urges-ftc-to-act-against-patent-
trolls/ (publishing Senator Leahy's letter to FTC Chairwoman Edith Ramirez "encourage[ing] the FTC
to prioritize investigations of and enforcement actions" against patent trolls).
33 May 2014 Comment Request, supra note 26, at 28,716.
34 15 U.S.C. § 46(b) (2012); May 2014 Comment Request, supra note 26, at 28,716.
35 May 2014 Comment Request, supra note 26, at 28,716.
36 See Lipman, supra note 15 (quoting Commissioner Wright as stating, "[a] study that is address-
ing the right research questions in the right way has to disappoint an audience that is just in it for the
thumbs-up or thumbs-down signal from an agency").
37 Id. (quoting Commissioner Wright).
2015] 1007
GEO. MASON L. REv.
The FTC study will proceed in two parts. The first part is designed to
investigate PAE behavior, while the second part is designed to compare
patent assertions by PAEs with patent assertions by non-PAEs. 8 Specifical-
ly, the first part of the study will be sent to approximately twenty-five firms"with a business model based primarily on purchasing patents and then
attempting to generate revenue by litigating against, or licensing to, persons
who are already practicing the patented technology."39 The FTC is asking
broad questions that include the following:
0 How do PAEs organize their corporate legal structure, including parents, subsidiaries,
and affiliates?
* What types of patents do PAEs hold and how do they organize their holdings?
* How do PAEs acquire patents; who are the prior patent owners; and how do they com-
pensate prior patent owners?
0 How do PAEs engage in assertion activity (i.e., how do they behave with respect to de-
mands, litigation, and licensing)?
* What does assertion activity cost PAEs?
" What do PAEs earn through assertion activity? and
" How does PAE patent assertion behavior compare to that of other entities that assert pa-
tents? 40
The second portion of the study will "compare[] how PAEs, manufac-
turing firms and NPEs assert intellectual property" within one limited tech-
nological sector: wireless communications." One area of exploration will
be "whether the potential for countersuit against manufacturing firms
changes their respective assertion behavior relative to PAE firms. ' '42 To
unearth this information, the FTC will solicit information from approxi-
mately fifteen manufacturing firms and NPEs that have asserted patents in
the wireless communications sector, allowing for comparison with PAEs.43
38 See May 2014 Comment Request, supra note 26, at 28,716 ("The FTC clarifies that the study
will consist of two parts. The primary focus of the study consists of a descriptive examination of the
PAE business model. The second part is a narrowly focused comparative case study of PAE activity in
the wireless communications sector.").
'9 Id. at28,715.40 Id. at 28,716-17.
41 Id. at 28,717.
42 id.
43 Id. There were a number of comments that requested the FTC not restrict its comparative study
to the wireless communications sector; however, the FTC responded that a limited study in this techno-
logical area was appropriate because the "sector is relatively well-defined with a significant amount of
assertion by PAEs, manufacturing firms, and NPEs" and to expand the study may be unduly burden-
some. May 2014 Comment Request, supra note 26, at 28,717.
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B. Effects of Patent Licensing Firms on Innovation and Competition
As with nearly everything, there is a potential for good and bad. The
same is true in the case of patent licensing firms, although one would not
know that based on popular and scholarly accounts of these firms. While
the harms allegedly caused by patent licensing firms have received much
attention, their potential benefits receive little attention and are generally
dismissed when even discussed.' The FTC's view is no different. For in-
stance, the FTC states "[e]ven if it is correct that PAEs incentivize and fund
the work of inventors, the effect of this activity on innovation can be detri-
mental."45 To provide a more balanced viewpoint, this Section briefly dis-
cusses both the potential positive and negative effects of patent licensing
firms.
1. Positive Effects of Patent Licensing Firms
The prevailing view, and the one the FTC holds, is that the only bene-
fit patent licensing firms serve is to compensate inventors, but that inven-
tion is not enough. The FTC states "[e]ven if PAEs arguably encourage
invention, they can deter innovation by raising costs and risks without mak-
ing a technological contribution."46 This is a rather shortsighted viewpoint
of the varied roles that patent licensing firms can play in the innovation
space, which can lead to healthy competition.
Broadly speaking, commercialization is a form of innovation; it is
simply the process of introducing a new product or process to the market. 47
But, as the FTC correctly notes, commercialization of an invention is any-
thing but simple;48 there are many steps between invention and the introduc-
tion of an actual product to the market and consumers. 49 These steps include
44 For just a few examples of the many articles extolling the negative aspects of"patent trolls," see
Bessen & Meurer, supra note 7, at 388; Colleen V. Chien, From Arms Race to Marketplace: The Com-
plex Patent Ecosystem and Its Implication for the Patent System, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 297, 300 (2010);
Sara Jeruss et al., The America Invents Act 500: Effects of Patent Monetization Entities on US Litiga-
tion, II DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 357, 358 (2012); Brian J. Love, An Empirical Study of Patent Litigation
Timing: Could a Patent Term Reduction Decimate Trolls without Harming Innovators?, 161 U. PA. L.
REV. 1309, 1310-11 (2013).
45 EVOLVING IP MARKETPLACE, supra note 9, at 69.
46 Id. at 9.
47 See OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, U.S. CONG., OTA-BP-ITC-165, INNOVATION AND
COMMERCIALIZATION OF EMERGING TECHNOLOGY 2 (1995) (defining "commercialization" as the
"attempt to profit from innovation through the sale or use of new products, processes, and services").
48 See EVOLVING IP MARKETPLACE, supra note 9, at 69 ("Invention is only the first step in an
often lengthy and expensive development process to bring an innovation to market.").
49 See, e.g., F. Scott Kieff, Property Rights and Property Rules for Commercializing Inventions,
85 MINN. L. REV. 697,707-08 (2001).
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transforming an idea into a marketable embodiment, developing facilities to
produce the marketable embodiment, creating distribution channels to bring
the embodiment to the consumer, and making the consumer aware of the
new product." Each of these steps requires its own additional resources in
the form of both capital and labor.5
Critics of patent licensing firms generally constrain "commercializa-
tion" to firms that manufacture and sell their own products. The reality is
that not every inventor is able to take an invention from an idea to market
product, and some that may be able to are uninterested or unwilling. This is
where a significant benefit of patent licensing firms is demonstrated: con-
necting inventors with an idea to manufacturers who can bring a product to
market.
Specifically, in addition to compensating inventors, patent licensing
firms facilitate commercialization through what has been termed "match-
making" and "market-making" functions.52 Billions of dollars are ex-
changed as patents are assigned, bought, and sold between actors in the
innovation economy. As a match-maker, a patent licensing firm can solve
problems that arise when the actors are asymmetrically situated.53 As a
market-maker, the patent licensing firms adds liquidity to patents and also
helps reduce information asymmetries.54 Both of these functions can result
in increased innovation and competition. Competition is particularly evi-
dent through these exchanges. The presence of patent licensing firms pro-
vides an inventor with choices of potential parties to assign his patent
rights. Patent licensing firms are subject to competition in and around the
patent as they work to convince companies to license the innovative tech-
nology.
With respect to the match-making function, patent licensing firms can
help connect patent buyers and sellers that may not otherwise find each
other, and thus serve as key intermediaries between those who are unable to
commercialize innovative technology and those who can.55 Patent licensing
firms also aid in match-making by presenting a credible threat of litigation
that an individual inventor may not have due to lack of resources to com-
mence and sustain an infringement lawsuit against a larger company.56 Fi-
50 id.
51 See id.
52 See Osenga, supra note 11, at 450; see also McDonough, supra note 1I, at 190.
53 See, e.g., Gregory Gorder, Innovation and the Invention Gap: The Need for a New Invention
Economy, 21 GEO. MASON L. REV. 811,822 (2014); Andrei Hagiu & David B. Yoffie, The New Patent
Intermediaries: Platforms, Defensive Aggregators, and Super-Aggregators, 27 J. ECON. PERSP. 45, 45
(2013).
54 E.g., McDonough, supra note II, at 190.
55 See, e.g., Hagiu & Yoffie, supra note 53, at 45-46, 49.
56 McDonough, supra note 11, at 209-10; Ryan T. Holte, Trolls or Great Inventors: Case Studies
of Patent Assertion Entities, 59 ST. Louis U. L.J. (forthcoming 2015) (manuscript at 11), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=2426444.
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nally, the most accepted, yet least appreciated, aspect of patent licensing
firms as match-makers is the transfer of resources to inventors, providing
funds for additional development activity. 7
With respect to market-making, patent licensing firms create a liquid
market, or a centralized market in which patents are bought when a seller is
ready and sold when a buyer is ready. 8 Furthermore, patent transactions
today often happen in a litigation-avoidance context, obscuring accurate
valuation. 9 Patent licensing firms, as experienced market participants, are
in a better position to evaluate patents using the valuation specialization and
experience they have obtained that individual inventors and small compa-
nies generally cannot. 6 As match-makers and market-makers, patent licens-
ing firms decrease information asymmetries, make more efficient transac-
tions possible, increase liquidity in the market for innovation, and, as a re-
sult, incentivize invention and commercialization.6'
2. Negative Effects of PA~s
The hyperbolic negative behaviors imputed to PAEs-the "surprise"
demand letters for outrageous fees,62 the "sneaking out from underneath a
bridge" to file a nuisance lawsuit in hopes of settling rather than having a
patent invalidated 63-have been discussed in detail elsewhere and so there
is no need to repeat them here.' With respect to innovation and competi-
tion, the general argument is as follows: the costs of investigating, respond-
ing to, and defending against patent assertion lawsuits (or paying unfound-
ed licensing fees) divert precious resources from invention and innovation
57 See, e.g., McDonough, supra note 11, at 190, 207; Schwartz & Kesan, supra note 7, at 428.
Some examples of this aspect include Intellectual Ventures, which has provided $500 million to indi-
vidual inventors while acting in a match-making capacity, and Acacia Research Corporation, a patent
licensing firm that provides inventors 50 percent of the total royalties collected from negotiated licenses.
Nicole Shanahan, Deconstructing the Patent Bubble: An Exploration of Patent Monetization Entities
from Sewing Machine Combination to Rockstar Bid Co. 17 (Jan. 24, 2013) (unpublished comment),
available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=2359912 (discussing testimony sent to
FTC from Acacia); Corporate Fact Sheet, INTELL. VENTURES, http://www.intellectual
ventures.com/assets-docs/IV Corporate Fact Sheet 2.pdf (last visited Feb. 8, 2015).
58 See, e.g., EVOLVING IP MARKETPLACE, supra note 9, at 68 (noting that the activity of a second-
ary market provided by patent licensing firms has increased liquidity of patents, allowing patentees to
recoup their research and development investments); McDonough, supra note 11, at 213-14.
59 Hagiu & Yoffie, supra note 53, at 48.
60 E.g., McDonough, supra note 11, at 214-15.
61 Id. at 223.
62 Jurata & Patel, supra note 2, at 1256.
63 Gerard N. Magliocca, Blackberries and Barnyards: Patent Trolls and the Perils of Innovatio n,
82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1809, 1814-15 (2007).
64 See sources cited supra note 44 (listing a sampling of anti-"patent troll" scholarship).
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efforts, resulting in fewer products (and players) on the market.65 There has
long been tension between antitrust and patent law.' While asserting patent
rights is not itself an antitrust violation, the actions of PAEs receive greater
scrutiny.67 More specifically, the negative effects associated with patent
licensing firms can be boiled down to four main areas: ex post licensing,
asymmetrical litigation positions, mass patent acquisition, and poor patent
quality.
Patent licensing firms are accused of engaging in an extraordinary
amount of ex post licensing. Ex post licensing, or the transfer of rights after
the licensee has already adopted the technology, is viewed as a much bigger
problem than ex ante licensing.6" In particular, if a company commercializes
technology it invented and then is sued by a patent licensing firm, the FTC
views the resulting license as being of questionable benefit to consumers.69
While ex ante licensing is said to increase innovation, ex post licensing
increases the risk and expense of innovation by others, decreasing the in-
centive to enter any particular technology space.7 °
Patent licensing firms are also alleged to have a better position when it
comes to litigation. Although litigation is costly for any party, practicing
entities suffer from indirect costs that patent licensing firms may not incur,
such as counterclaims, disruption of business, and loss of reputation.7
When a practicing entity sues another practicing entity, the symmetry of
risks encourages fair licensing and discourages aggressive litigation.72 On
the other hand, the risks are asymmetrical when a patent licensing firm sues
65 Joshua D. Wright, Comm'r, Fed. Trade Comm'n, What Role Should Antitrust Play in Regulat-
ing the Activities of Patent Assertion Entities?, Remarks at the Dechert Client Annual Antitrust Spring
Seminar 10 (Apr. 17, 2013) [hereinafter Wright Dechert Remarks], available at http://
www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/public statements/what-role-should-antitrust-play-regulating-
activities-patent-assertion-entities/130417paespeech.pdf.
66 See, e.g., Giles S. Rich, The Relation Between Patent Practices and the Anti-Monopoly Laws,
14 FED. CIR. B.J. 21, 32, 36 (2004).
67 See, e.g., Jay Levine, FTC Study on "Patent Troll" Behavior: Innovation Enhancers or Compe-
tition Killers, TECH. L. SOURCE (Oct. 8, 2013), http://www.technologylawsource.com/2013/10/
articles/intellectual-property- I/ftc-study-on-patent-troll -behavior-innovation-enhancers-or-competition-
killers/. In fact, some argue that even when a PAE acquires patents from a practicing entity to aggres-
sively monetize the asset, it would not violate antitrust laws. See, e.g., Carl Shapiro, Professor, Patent
Assertion Entities: Effective Monetizers, Tax on Innovation, or Both?, Presentation at the FTC and
DOJ's Patent Assertion Entity Activities Workshop 22 (Dec. 10, 2012), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/opp/workshops/pae/docs/cshapiro.pdf.
68 See EVOLVING IP MARKETPLACE, supra note 9, at 52 ("When a company commercializes
technology that it invented independently and later faces a patent assertion, the resulting ex post license
provides no direct benefits to consumers, however.").
69 Id. However, if the technology was copied from the patentee, the calculus is different. Id. at 52
n.8.
70 Id. at 52-54, 69.
71 Wright Dechert Remarks, supra note 65, at 5-6.
72 Id. at 6.
1012 [VOL. 22:4
STICKS AND STONES
a practicing entity, because patent licensing firms face little risk of counter-
claims or business disruption."3 In addition, patent licensing firms are often
able to better handle litigation costs through creative structuring of legal
fees, capturing economies of scale, and lowering discovery costs as fewer
documents are involved in a patent licensing firm's ordinary course of
business.74
Mass patent acquisition is another area of concern in the field of patent
licensing firms. Although the business model of monetizing patents by li-
censing has long been used, the aggregation of mass quantities of patents is
a somewhat recent development.75 The large portfolios of patents held by
patent licensing firms may have the potential to increase their market power
and change their enforcement incentives.76 Further, because patent licensing
firms sometimes hold significant patent portfolios, critics allege it is diffi-
cult to know which of the many patents being offered for license are being
infringed, and it is difficult to separate the strong from the weak patents.77
The efforts required to make these distinctions are just too great, and patent
licensing firms often offer licensing of the entire portfolio, or at least a sub-
stantial portion thereof, making such distinctions irrelevant.78 A related is-
sue to mass patent acquisition is the acquisition of patents from practicing
entities, particularly if the practicing entity remains involved in the licens-
ing of the patents.79 This coordination gives rise to hybrid patent licensing
firms or "patent privateers."
The last concern is that patent licensing firms are alleged to assert pa-
tents of questionable quality. This is problematic because "monetiz[ing] []
low-quality patents imposes a de facto tax on productive economic activity,
with little or no offsetting benefits for consumers."8 Although the flaws in
the patent system affect everyone, it is asserted that patent licensing firms
are able to exploit these flaws to the fullest to wreak the most havoc on
innovation and competition.8"
73 Id.
74 id.
75 Id. at 7-8.
76 Jurata & Patel, supra note 2, at 1257-58.
77 Jay Levine, FTC Study on "Patent Troll" Behavior: Innovation Enhancers or Competition
Killers? Part 2, TECH. L. SOURCE (Oct. 14, 2013), http://www.technologylawsource.com/2013/10
/artic les/intellectual -property- I /flc-study-on-patent-troll-behavior-innovation-enhancers-or-competition-
killers-part-2/.
78 Id.
79 id.
80 E.g, Levy, supra note 14 (quoting Ramirez, supra note 14, at 10) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
81 See id.
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II. PROBLEMS WITH THE FTC STUDY
It is clear the FTC study could shed some much-needed light on the
activities of patent licensing firms and how these activities affect innovation
and competition. For the sake of more productive policy discussions and
more tailored patent reform, having a detailed understanding of the com-
plex world of patent licensing firms would be an incredible boon. However,
the configuration of the study is slanted in such a way that only part of the
story will be uncovered. Worse still, the study has been shaped in a way
that will simply add fuel to the anti-"patent troll" fire without providing any
data that would explain the best way to fix the real problems in the patent
field today. To be clear, this Essay is not suggesting that there are no prob-
lems in the patent field, or even that patent licensing firms present no con-
cerns for innovation and competition. However, the problems that do exist
should be tied to behaviors that hinder innovation and competition, not to
categories of patent holders, regardless of their behaviors. A carefully draft-
ed study into patent licensing firms would be able to separate patent holders
from patent activities and focus the policy and reform discussions on the
right target.
This Essay posits that there are two key, albeit related, flaws with the
FTC study. First, the study perpetuates the mistaken notion that all patent
licensing firms are the same by drafting its study such that the recipients of
the survey are selected via a one-size-fits-all definition. Second, although
the FTC claims to be studying the different business and organizational
models of patent licensing firms, there are few questions related to that is-
sue and the questions that are asked do not probe some very significant
aspects of patent licensing firms. Each of these flaws will be described in
detail below.
A. The FTC's Definition of PAE Ignores the Heterogeneity and Complex-
ity of Patent Licensing Firms
To truly understand the impact that patent licensing firms have on in-
novation and competition, it is critical to acknowledge that patent licensing
firms are not homogenous. The current one-dimensional viewpoint turns all
patent licensing firms into caricatures, which fires up the rhetoric but ob-
scures thoughtful discussion and debate about the issue.82 The root of this
problem is that the term "patent troll" has no consistent meaning among
82 Wright Dechert Remarks, supra note 65, at 8 (explaining that patent troll debate is more com-
plicated "than the rival caricature[s]" suggest, but the truth can be found by listening carefully to the
data).
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agencies, policy makers, and scholars.83 Because there is no consistent
meaning, people use the term broadly so as to include all of the types of
entities that they wish to malign. This creates a category that necessarily
includes multiple different business models lumped together without regard
for their individual qualities or behaviors.
For purposes of the § 6(b) study, the FTC has defined PAEs as "firms
with a business model based primarily on purchasing patents and then at-
tempting to generate revenue by litigating against, or licensing to, persons
who are already practicing the patented technology."' The "already practic-
ing" clause of the definition may seem a bit extraneous, as there can be no
infringement actions and no credible licensing demands if the manufactur-
ing party is not practicing the patented technology. However, it seems that
the FTC is trying to discuss ex post licensing.85 Beyond this, there are two
things to note about the FTC's definition: first, it is narrower than many of
the definitions that have been used by others studying patent licensing
firms; and second, it does not reflect the idea that the patent licensing firm
ecosystem is complex.
There are at least three features that cause the FTC definition to be
narrower than that of others commonly referred to: the "purchasing" re-
quirement; the "already practicing" requirement; and the wide exclusion for
NPEs. For example, Professors Mark Lemley and Douglas Melamed define"patent trolls" as "patent owners whose primary business is collecting mon-
ey from others that allegedly infringe their patents."86 Professor Colleen
Chien's definition includes firms whose primary business is to assert pa-
tents.87 Neither the Lemley and Melamed definition nor the Chien definition
hinges on whether the asserted patents were, in general, purchased or
whether the alleged infringer was "already practicing" the patented tech-
nology. The FTC definition is also narrower than that used by Professors
Jim Bessen and Michael Meurer in that the FTC specifically excludes cer-
83 E.g., Demand Letters and Consumer Protection: Examining Deceptive Practices by Patent
Assertion Entities: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Consumer Prot., Prod. Safety, & Ins. of the S.
Comm. on Commerce, Sci., & Transp., 113th Cong. 37 (2013) (statement of Adam Mossoff, Prof. of
Law, George Mason Univ. Sch. of Law, and Senior Scholar, Ctr. for the Prot. of Intellectual Prop.)
("[T]here is no settled, agreed-upon definition of a PAE [(i.e., patent assertion entity)] or patent troll...
."); Bessen & Meurer, supra note 7, at 396 ("There is no consensus among researchers on the proper
definition of [non-practicing entity, or patent troll]."); Jeruss et al., supra note 44, at 366 ("There... has
been considerable disagreement about the type of entity to include in the category of 'non-practicing
entity."'); Jason Rantanen, Slaying the Troll: Litigation as an Effective Strategy Against Patent Threats,
23 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 159, 163-64 (2006) (noting "the difficulty of defining
exactly what a patent troll is").
84 May 2014 Comment Request, supra note 26, at 28,715. This has been refined from an earlier
definition. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
85 See supra notes 68-70 and accompanying text.
86 Lemley & Melamed, supra note 4, at 2118.
87 Chien, supra note 7.
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tain NPEs, such as universities, whereas Bessen and Meurer do not.88 Simi-
lar comparisons could be made with other popular "patent troll" definitions.
It is not just an academic exercise to point out these differences be-
tween the FTC's definition and those used by others. If patent licensing
firms are going to be lumped into a single category, it is important that the
category at least have a consistent meaning. The data that will be discov-
ered through the FTC's study will be used to drive action in the patent re-
form and policy realms, but what kind of debate can be had if the parties to
the discussion are talking about different things? This would be like a group
of people sitting around a table discussing the pros and cons of planting
fruit trees, where each of the participants has a different type of fruit in
mind. Because all patent licensing firms, like all fruit trees, are not alike, it
is important that, at the very least, the specific differences of the FTC's
definition be emphasized when considering and analyzing the data received.
Whether narrow or broad, the FTC's definition is still one-
dimensional. The FTC acknowledged in its 2011 report that, over the past
decade, a number of "increasingly sophisticated and complex" business
models have emerged."9 The report noted that PAEs may originate in differ-
ent ways, including not just firms that are formed for the purpose of patent
assertion, but also firms that were once manufacturing firms that "have
turned their focus away from the active development or practice of their
patents and have moved towards patent enforcement."' The report also
differentiated among firms it categorized as "[p]atent enforcement and li-
censing companies," "[l]itigation finance firms," and "[p]atent aggrega-
tors."'" How these firms originated, how these firms evolved, and how these
firms currently behave would all seem to be relevant when determining
what type of patent licensing firms should be part of the § 6(b) study, as
well as when discussing patent policy and reform. But the FTC's definition
is instead one-size-fits-all. Although the FTC states it will seek information
from firms that "use different organizational models and assertion strate-
gies,"92 its definition does not allow for as wide a variety as would be use-
ful, nor does it ensure that a wide variety will be surveyed. For this reason,
it is possible that the FTC will fail to study an appropriately diverse group
of patent licensing firms that would make for robust results and better un-
derstanding of the complexity of those using this business model.
88 Compare Bessen & Meurer, supra note 7, at 395-96, with EVOLVING IP MARKETPLACE, supra
note 9, at 8 n.5.
89 EVOLVING IP MARKETPLACE, supra note 9, at 62-63.
90 Id. at 60-61 (quoting Chien, supra note 44, at 329-30) (internal quotation marks omitted). See
generally Osenga, supra note 11, at 453, for an in-depth look at patent licensing firms that began as
manufacturing firms.
91 EVOLVING IP MARKETPLACE, supra note 9, at 62-66. The report also mentions "[d]efensive
buying funds" and an ambiguous "[i]ntermediaries" category. Id. at 66-67.
92 May 2014 Comment Request, supra note 26, at 28,717.
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B. The FTC's Survey Questions Do Not Address Important Variations
in Business Models
Studying patent licensing firms and their impact on innovation and
competition cannot simply be a matter of counting how many patents a firm
has or how many times it has sued a practicing entity after licensing negoti-
ations broke down. These simple questions belie the complexity of the pa-
tent licensing business model and have already resulted in incomplete data
that have been singularly unhelpful in presenting an accurate view of patent
licensing firms. The FTC's ability to ask more interesting questions, such as
how these firms acquire their patents and from whom, how much they
spend and how much they earn in these transactions, and so forth, will cer-
tainly provide data where there is currently a black hole. There is one type
of question, however, that is not being asked: why?
The "why" question is hard to ask and hard to answer, but can lead to
valuable information. As Commissioner Wright notes, the FTC's definition
of PAE fails to tell a complete story, as it ignores important questions such
as "[w]hy ... patent holders sell to PAEs? ... [and] [w]hy. . . PAEs pur-
chase the patents?"93 Commissioner Wright continues by stating that the
reasons for selling, such as lacking capabilities to exploit the innovative
technology, are as varied as the reasons for buying.94 This Essay asserts
there is another "why" question that is relevant to the effects of the licens-
ing business model on innovation and competition: "why are you a patent
licensing firm?" To ask the question another way, "what type of patent li-
censing firm are you?" And yes, it does matter. Even anti-"patent troll"
scholarship admits that some patent licensing firms could provide positive
impact.95
Answers to "why" a firm follows a patent licensing business model
vary. Some, of course, begin with this business model in mind.96 Others
invent new technology but are unable to successfully commercialize it
themselves, despite making efforts to do so.97 Still others exist as practicing
93 Wright Dechert Remarks, supra note 65, at 2.
94 Id.
95 See, e.g., Bessen & Meurer, supra note 7, at 396 ("It is surely difficult to attempt to distinguish
'good' . . . from 'bad' [trolls] .... ); Chien, supra note 44, at 320 (stating that, among PAEs, there are
"many kinds of entities, each with its own ... patent strategy," and noting it can be hard to distinguish
between good and bad trolls); Love, supra note 44, 1314-15 (stating that "patent trolls" can either be
"extortionists" or helpful disseminators of innovative technology).
96 See, e.g., Raymond Millien & Ron Laurie, A Summary of Established & Emerging IP Business
Models 4 (Oct. 12, 2007) (working paper from the Eighth Annual Sedona Conference on Patent Litiga-
tion), available at http://www.concap.cc/wp-content/uploads/2012/03/IP-Business-Models.pdf (identify-
ing Acacia Research Corporation as an example).
97 E.g., Michael Arrington, What to Do with Failed Startup JP?, TECHCRUNCH (May 6, 2008),
http://techcrunch.com/2008/05/06/what-to-do-with-failed-startup-ip/ (presenting Edgeio, Inc. as exam-
ple ofa startup that failed and subsequently sold its IP assets to third parties); Adam Pasick, "The Un-
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entities for years or decades before something changes-supply change
issues, rampant infringement by competitors, and regulatory initiatives-
and they are no longer able to exist as a viable practicing entity. Answers
to "what" type of patent licensing firm one is also vary. Some firms exist
solely as patent intermediaries, buying and selling patents."9 Other firms
license patents on technology they developed and tried to commercialize."0
Still others license their own patents, as well as complementary patents they
have obtained.' ° There are firms that, in addition to licensing patents-
whether their own, or those they have obtained, or both-also develop new
innovative technology that they also make available for license. 02 Some
firms that previously operated as practicing entities continue to support and
refine their products. 03
The questions the FTC asked about the organization of patent licens-
ing firms do not seek answers that would illuminate these issues. Regarding
"Firm Information," the FTC simply asks for the business's legal names,
the corporate structure including subsidiaries, and other persons who are
engaged in patent assertions or have some sort of interest in the firm."0 And
although the FTC plans to survey firms with "different organizational mod-
els," the differences described above are unlikely to be the criteria used. 05
Again, these are not simply musings about how patent licensing firms
can be sub-categorized. The type of patent licensing firm and the reason for
it being a patent licensing firm may have implications for what type of im-
pact that particular licensing firm or similarly situated firms have on inno-
vation and competition. Consider companies that used to be practicing enti-
ties, but now function primarily as patent licensing firms. One example of
this type of patent licensing firm would be Conversant, which operated for
many years as the semiconductor manufacturing company MOSAID. "o6 One
possible impact of a firm's origin may be that there is less concern about ex
post licensing, as competitors were on notice based on the firm's commer-
dertaker" of Venture Capital, REUTERS UNSTRUCTURED FIN. BLOG. (July 7, 2008),
bttp://blogs.reuters.com/unstructuredfinance/2008/07/07/the-undertaker-of-venture-capitalU (identifying
Sherwood Partners as a company that specializes in purchasing and reselling IP assets of failed entities).
98 See Osenga, supra, note 11, at 453-64 (presenting case studies of former manufacturing entities
that shifted their business models to licensing, such as Conversant Intellectual Property Management,
Soverain Software, Immersion Corporation, and Rockstar Consortium).
99 E.g., Hagiu & Yoffie, supra note 53, at 49 (identifying Thinkfire, IPValue, and Pluritas as
examples of traditional patent intermediaries).
100 See EVOLVING IP MARKETPLACE, supra note 9, at 40-41.
101 E.g., Osenga, supra note 11, at 456.
102 E.g., Corporate Fact Sheet, supra note 57.
103 History, CONVERSANT INTELL. PROP. MGMT., http://conversantip.com/about/history/ (last
visited Feb. 13, 2015).
104 May 2014 Comment Request, supra note 26, at 28,718. The questions do seek details about the
origins of the patents owned and asserted, but this is a small piece of the issue discussed above.
105 Id at 28,717.
106 History, supra note 103.
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cialization of its own products.° 7 Another impact would address asymmet-
rical litigation positions, as a firm that was once part of an industry may
have a different business ethos based on maintaining its reputation in the
relevant industry.0 8 Finally, in the market-making arena, this type of firm is
more likely to be better at evaluating innovative technology due to its expe-
rience in commercializing it themselves."'° Or consider firms that are not
just engaged in licensing of acquired innovative technology, but also have
active research facilities that provide new technologies of their own. An
example of this type of firm would be Intellectual Ventures, which employs
numerous inventors and is regularly developing innovative technology. "'
On the flipside from firms that used to act as practicing entities, firms that
are inventing as well as licensing are in a unique position when serving as
match-makers and market-makers because they understand the pre-
commercialization issues and the difficulties in obtaining ex ante licens-
ing."' Further, the incentives to exploit poor patent quality are different
when a firm is not just the patent holder, but also the inventive entity.112
Despite the potential positive impacts (or at least a mitigation of the nega-
tive impacts) that are mentioned above, both Conversant and Intellectual
Ventures, as well as many other similarly situated firms, are lumped into
the category of "patent trolls" and are vilified without regard to their actual
behaviors-positive or negative. "3 Because the FTC survey does not ask
the right questions, this problem is unlikely to change.
CONCLUSION
The outcome of the FTC's study will be used to shape policy deci-
sions, and so a more nuanced view of patent licensing firms is required.
Recommendations thus far and rhetoric surrounding the issue consolidate
all patent licensing firms into a single group without looking at the different
origins, different types, and different behaviors that separate these firms.
Ideally all patent and policy reform would be based solely around deterring
behaviors that may harm innovation and competition. However, to the ex-
107 Osenga, supra note I I, at 475.
108 Id. at 473-74.
109 Id. at 475.
110 Corporate Fact Sheet, supra note 57 (stating that Intellectual Ventures has more than "4,000
active inventors and 400 universities and institutions in [its] international network").
111 Osenga, supra note 1I, at 450-52.
112 Compare id. at 473-74, with Lemley & Melamed, supra note 4, at 2125-28.
113 See, e.g., Gene Quinn, Intellectual Ventures Becomes Patent Troll Public Enemy #1, IP
WATCHDOG (Dec. 9, 2010), http://ipwatchdog.com/2010/12/09/intellectual-ventures-becomes-patent-
troll-public-enemy-I/id=13711; see also Lemley & Melamed, supra note 4, at 2136 n.83 (naming Con-
versant among "patent trolls"); This American Life: When Patents Attack!, supra note I ("[The] blog, IP
Watchdog, called Intellectual Ventures 'patent troll public enemy #1."' (quoting Quinn, supra)).
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tent that policy discussions must, for reasons of convenience, revolve
around categories of actors, it is important to acknowledge there are many
sub-categories under the "patent troll" umbrella, and any action must be
more narrowly tailored than those recently suggested reforms. A more
open-minded study by the FTC could go a long way towards explaining the
variety of business models that engage in patent licensing, and thus eventu-
ally creating more tailored policy and legislative reform. Unfortunately, the
criteria for selecting firms for study and the questions that are being asked
of these firms about their business models are unlikely to reveal these im-
portant differences, and therefore will not provide the information needed
to take a better approach to solving the problem.
